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NOTES
HEIR HUNTING

-A

PROFESSION OR A RACKET?

The business or profession known as "heir-hunting" or "heir-

chasing"1 has a checkered and interesting history, having long been
established on an internationa 2 and local 3 basis as a lucrative means of
livelihood. 4 "Probate searchers" usually operate by investigating probate or surrogate court records to uncover estates of substantial wealth
whose probate or administration has been delayed because of inability
to contact one or more of the missing heirs. An investigator, usually
unknown to the estate, locates the missing heir through court records
and genealogical information collected by his staff, and at times
through cooperation with foreign agents in the same business. The
missing person is hastily informed that he has a valid claim as an heir
against an unsettled estate. He is promised genealogical charts and
other information with which he can establish his heirship if he will
assign a portion of his inheritance to the probate searcher. As a result
of their frequent legal blunders, these investigators have constantly
changed their pattern of procedure in order to come formally within
the law.5
In dealing with the problem of heir-hunting, this note will be
limited to a discussion of the agreement - written, 6 oral7 implied8 or a
1. Note the distinction drawn between "chasers" and "hunters" in Carey v.
Thieme, 2 N.J. Super. 458, 64 A.2d 394, 398 (Ch. 1949).
2. Merlaud v. National Metropolitan Bank, 84 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1936)
(citizen of Paris, France, in practice of international probate research). Both
In re Tuthill, 256 App. Div. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 643 (lst Dep't 1939), and In re
Wellington's Estate, 154 Misc. 271, 276 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Surr. Ct. 1935), concerned contracts of the Trans-Atlantic Estates & Credit Company.
3. Wedgerfield v. De Bernardy, 24 T.L.R. 497, affd, 25 T.L.R. 21 (1908).
4. Rees v. De Bernardy, [1896] 2 Ch. 437; Sprye v. Porter, 7 El. & B1. 58,
119 Eng. Rep. 1169 (1856); Reynell v. Sprye, 1 De G.M. & G. 660, 42 Eng. Rep.
710 (Ch. 1852).

5. See Rees v. De Bernardy, [18961 2 Ch. 437. The first agreement used by
De Bernardy, the heir-hunter, was not merely to furnish information but also
to recover the property; this was void as a champertous contract. Subsequently, De Bernardy avoided this trap by agreeing only to furnish the information in return for a share in the property and this practice was upheld
in Wedgerfield v. De Bernardy, 24 T.L.R. 497 (1908). Joseph Woerndle, the
non-lawyer owner of Trans-Atlantic Estates & Credit Company, began by
soliciting from beneficiaries their power of attorney; but this was held to be
illegal practice of law. In re Lynch's Estate, 154 Misc. 260, 276 N.Y. Supp. 939
(Surr. Ct. 1935); In re Wellington's Estate, 154 Misc. 271, 276 N.Y. Supp. 946
(Surr. Ct. 1935). Next the court held that a power of attorney authorizing
the Trans-Atlantic Estates & Credit Company to appoint attorneys in connection with the settlement of an estate was void, as the illegal practice of
law by a corporation. In re Vogelsang's Estate, 162 Misc. 257, 293 N.Y. Supp. 346
(Surr. Ct. 1937). Thereupon Woerndle hired for the corporation a lawyer
who subsequently was disbarred for his connection with a soliciting corporation. In re Tuthill, 256 App. Div. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1st Dep't 1939).
6. The heir ma be liable under a written contract which contains the
entire agreement. See, e.g., In re Cohen's Estate, 66 Cal. App.2d 450, 152 P.2d
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combination of these9 - under which the heir-hunter seeks to recover10 or from which the heir seeks to be relieved;" this agreement is
the pivotal point of controversy, complicated by many factual distinctions.
Jurisdictionof Equity to Rescind:
The protection of testamentary beneficiaries and expectant heirs
from the imposition of unnecessary expenses has traditionally been
considered within the jurisdiction of equity. 12 It is a protection which
the courts have rigidly exercised in the public interest. In fact, "equity
extended to such persons a degree of protection approaching nearly
to rendering them incapable of binding themselves by any contract;
relief .was granted ... without requiring any particular evidence of
imposition, a burden of proof being cast upon the purchaser to show
13
that he paid a fair and just price."'
In seeking to bridle this activity, the courts have equated their heirhunter's contract to contracts for the sale of a contingent interest by
an expectant heir. Each fact situation is carefully analyzed to ascertain
any possible inequity resulting from inequality of the bargaining
positions; 14 sharp practice of over-reaching, 15 especially where one
485 (1944); Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 150 N.E. 9 (1926) (sealed instru-

ment); Sparne v. Altshuler, 90 A.2d 919 (R.I. 1952) (printed form); Sprye
v. Porter, 7 El. & B1. 58, 119 Eng. Rep. 1169 (1856).
7. Note the judges' discussion of possible methods of making such agreements in Reynell v. Sprye, 1 De G.M. & G. 660, 42 Eng. Rep. 710 (Ch. 1852).
8. Where the services of the heir-hunter actually confer a benefit, a contract
will be implied in law. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of O'Donnell's Estate,
85 Cal. App.2d 1, 192 P.2d 94, rehearing denied, 85 Cal. App.2d 816, 193 P.2d
143 (1948); Rees v. De Bernardy, [1896] 2 Ch. 437 (oral agreement).
9. In Rees v. De Bernardy, [1896] 2 Ch. 437, the heir-chaser made a
written agreement which in itself provided only for the sale of information
on a contingent fee basis. However, the court found that he also orally arranged to recover the heirs' property for them. This represents the usual
method in which the formal contract is carefully drawn to avoid any champertous element, but a collateral oral agreement is entered into whereby the
chaser champertously promises to bear expenses and perfect the claim for
the heir. See, Transcript of Record, p. 15, Downs v. Altshuler, Eq. No. 21801,
R.I. Super. Ct., 1953, to the effect that while the contract itself was not
champertous the acts of the heir-hunters were evidence of a champertous,
implied or oral, agreement. See Miller v. Anderson, 183 Wis. 163, 196 N.W. 869,
871, 34 A.L.R. 1529 (1924) (parol evidence competent to show that a writing
valid on its face is mere cover for champertous oral agreement).
10. See, e.g., Merlaud v. National Metropolitan Bank, 84 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir.
1936); Spraye v. Porter, 7 El. & Bl. 58, 119 Eng. Rep. 1169 (1856).
11. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of O'Donnell's Estate, 85 Cal. App.2d 1,
192 P.2d 94 (1948) (suit by guardian of incompetent for relief from heirhunter's contract); Carey v. Thieme, 2 N.J. Super. 458, 64 A.2d 394 (Ch. 1949);
McIlwain's Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 619 (1936); Sparne v. Altshuler, 90 A.2d
919 (R.I. 1952); Rees v. De Bernardy, [1896] 2 Ch. 437.
12. See 3 PolvmRoY, EQuITY JuRIsPRuDENCE § 953 (5th ed. 1941); 9 Am. JuR.,
Cancelation of Instruments § 27 (1937).
13. 9 Am. Jup., Cancelation of Instruments § 27 (1937).
14. See Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 150 N.E. 9, 11 (1926); BIsPffivr,
PariNcIPLEs oF EQUITY 373 (10th ed. 1924).
15. Stone v. Moody, 41 Wash. 680, 84 Pac. 617, 619 (1906). Equity will set
aside a contract when it plainly appears that one party overreached the other.
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party is in financial distress and subject to a "catching bargain"; 16 inadequacy of consideration; 7 any advantage taken of a fiduciary relationship;18 misrepresentation or surprise; 19 fraud or unconscionable acts
20
which may be inferred from the nature and subject of the agreement;
any speedy solicitation or unduly urgent pressure to sign without
independent advice. Relief from the contract is granted whether the
party-litigant is an expectant heir or a missing heir.
Illegal and UnethicalPracticeof Law:
Compensation under these contracts has ordinarily been contingent
upon actual recovery by the missing heir. Therefore, the contracts
often include a power of attorney or right to bring suit, at the genealogist's expense, in behalf of the heir. 2' The courts probe the entire
agreement to ascertain whether the heir-chaser (lawyer, corporation
or layman), secured control of litigation in this manner either by
agreeing to employ2 or by serving23 as the heir's attorney; such activity
See 5 L.R.A. (x.s.) 799 (1907), citing cases that show the effect of ignorance
on equitable relief from an overreaching contract.
16. See 30 C.J.S., Equity § 50b (1942).
17..In re Larson's Estate, 92 Cal. App.2d 267, 206 P.2d 852, 856 (1949) (burden on heir-hunter to prove adequacy of consideration). On the inference of
fraud from mere inadequacy of consideration, see 3 PoMuaoy, EQUITY JuRIsPRUDENCE § 953 (5th ed. 1941).
18. The tendency of modern decisions is to uphold the transfer of expectant
interests unless there is a confidential relationship or actual bad faith. BISPHAM,
PRINcImLES oF EQUITY 374 (10th ed. 1924). See also 30 C.J.S., Equity § 50b
(1942).
19. These are common grounds upon which equity will void a contract. 3
PomERoY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE § 953 (a) (5th ed. 1941).
20. Equity will seize upon imposition or artifice as sufficient to constitute
fraud where the circumstances are such that public policy requires that they
should be treated in the same manner as fraudulent acts. Gargano v. Pope,
184 Mass. 571, 69 N.E. 343, 100 Am. ST. REP. 575 (1904) (Champertous contract held void on ground of constructive fraud). See also 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 924, 943 (5th ed. 1941).
21. For cases containing this champertous element, see Merlaud v. National
Metropolitan Bank, 84 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 584
(1936) (probate searcher was to pay all expenses incidental to prosecuting
legatee's claim); Casserleigh v. Wood, 119 Fed. 308 (8th Cir. 1902) (complete
control of litigation); In re Butler's Estate, 29 Cal.2d 644, 177 P.2d 16, 171
A.L.R. 343 (1947); In re Reilly's Estate, 81 Cal. App. 2d 564, 184 P.2d 922 (1947).
22. In re Butler's Estate, 29 Cal.2d 644, 177 P.2d 16, 171 A.L.R. 343 (1947);
In re Larson's Estate, 92 Cal. App.2d 267, 206 P.2d 852 (1949) (agreement to
employ counsel and not to act himself); In re Reilly's Estate, 81 Cal. App.2d 564,
184 P.2d 922 (1947) (attorney in fact, to hire counsel for heir); Carey v.
Thieme, 2 N.J. Super 458, 64 A.2d 394 (Ch. 1949) (retain attorney for the
beneficiary); In re Vogelsang's Estate, 162 Misc. 257, 293 N.Y. Supp. 346
(Surr. Ct. 1937) (appointment of attorney by research organization; practice
of law by a corporation); In re Lynch's Estate, 154 Misc. 260, 276 N.Y. Supp.
939 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
23.. See, e.g., Merlaud v. National Metropolitan Bank, 84 F.2d 238, 240 (D.C.
Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 584 (1936) (contract for attorney to prosecute at his own expense held champertous); In re Tuthill, 256 App. Div. 539,
10 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1st Dep't 1939), appeal denied, 256 App. Div. 1059, 11 N.Y.S.2d
842 (1st Dep't 1939) (attorney assisted corporation which solicited heirs; corporation then employed attorney; attorney disbarred).
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constitutes unethical or illegal practice of law.24 Where he acts as
middle-man between the attorney and his client, agreeing to hire the
attorneys or bear the expense of necessary litigation, his activity is
held to be "commercial exploitation of the legal profession."2 The
professional heir-hunters have learned to conceal these illegal practices by omitting in the formal written contract any reference to their
control of the heir's claim. The courts have not been misled very often
by this subterfuge, but have also looked to other facts, such as oral
agreements and superior knowledge, to find any intended control of
litigation.26 Wherever a non-lawyer has solicited and obtained authority from a testamentary beneficiary to represent him in legal proceedings concerning his share of the estate, the courts have held that
to be the illegal practice of law.27 Participation by an attorney in the
solicitation of a missing heir to establish his claim in an estate in
consideration of a portion of his inheritance has been held to be a
breach of the 35th Canon of Professional Ethics and sufficient grounds
for disbarment.28 This practice is analogous to the illegal solicitation
known as "ambulance chasing."29
Adequacy of Considerationand Reasonableness of Compensation:
The heir-hunter has the burden of proving valuable consideration. 0
He must show the court that the heir was in truth missing and that
24. See Note, 17 A.L.R. 351 (1947). While a contract merely to furnish information for a share in the recovery is not valid, yet the same may be made
void by a further provision which is illegal, i.e., an agreement to secure
such additional evidence and information, as may be necessary to establish

heir's claim. See Note, 34 A.L.R. 1537, 1539 (1925).
25. In re Butler's Estate, 29 Cal.2d 644, 177 P.2d 16, 18, 171 A.L.R. 343
(1947). See also In re Larson's Estate, 92 Cal. App.2d 267, 206 P.2d 852, 856
(1949); In re Reilly's Estate, 81 Cal. App.2d 564, 184 P.2d 922, 924 (1947).
26. In Sprye v. Porter, 7 El. & B1. 58, 119, Eng. Rep. 1169, 1179 (1856), the
proposed agreement for sale of evidence was valid, but facts were admitted
which tended to prove that the stranger illegally agreed to promote the litigation. Evidence is admissable to show that an agreement legal on its face was
in fact an illegal transaction. Miller v. Anderson, 183 Wis. 163, 196 N.W. 869
(1924). See also Sherman v. Burton, 165 Mich. 293, 130 N.W. 667, 33 L.R.A.
(M.s.) 87 (1911) (a contract must be measured by its tendency, and not alone
by what was done to carry it out). It is not the agreement which is champertous but the "manner in which it was interpreted and carried out by the
Altshulers." Transcript of Record, p. 8, Downs v. Altshuler, Eq. No. 21801, R.I.
Super. Ct., 1953. But see Sparne v. Altshuler, 90 A.2d 919 (R.I. 1952) (the court
overlooked the significant evidence that Altshuler orally and impliedly contracted champertously to recover the property for the heir).
27. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App.2d 592, 52 P.2d
992, 994 (1935); Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. 1, 247 N.W. 97, 99,
86 A.L.R. 509 (1933).
28. See In re Tuthill, 256 App. Div. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (1st Dep't
1939). The New York court held in disbarring Tuthill that such acts violated
the 35th Canon of Professional Ethics which provides: "The professional
services of a lawyer should not be controlled ... by any lay agency, personal
or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer."
29. See Howe v. State Bar of California, 212 Cal. 222, 298 Pac. 25, 28 (1931);
Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. 1, 247 N.W. 97, 99 (1933).
30. See Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 150 N.E. 9, 11, 42 A.L.R. 1142, 1145
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the administrator has not or most likely would not have been able to
locate the heir through "the ordinary and natural processes of law."3 1
A reasonable lapse of time between the issuance of the letters of
administration and the execution of the contract is said to be evidence
that the administrator was unable to locate the heir.3 2 Actually, the
courts have consistently refused to find valuable consideration where
there has not been a reasonable lapse of time.33
Even where valuable consideration has been demonstrated, the heirhunter's compensation must be shown to be reasonable. The genealogists' fees have varied from one-fifth 4 to two-thirds 35 with the usual
(1926) (undisclosed assets), which points out an analogy to thb "reward
cases," in which the offeror of a reward is liable for accepted information.
Besse v. Dyer, 8 Allen 151, 85 Am. Dec. 747 (Mass. 1864); Jenkins v. Kelren,
12 Gray 330, 74 Am. Dec. 596 (Mass. 1859); Furman v. Parke, 21 N.J.L, 310
(Sup. Ct. 1898). See 1 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 33 (3d ed. 1936); Notes, 10 MrNN.
L. REv. 433, 434 (1926), 1 NOTRE DAME LAw. 126 (1926).

But cf., Pool v.

City of Boston, 59 Mass. 219 (1849) (duty to reveal information; no consideration for reward).
31. In re Larson's Estate, 92 Cal. App.2d 267, 206 P.2d 852, 856 (1949) (heir
was not in fact a "missing" heir); In re Reilly's Estate, 81 Cal. App.2d 564, 184
P.2d 922, 924 (1947) (record failed to show that heir was "missing"). See also
Sprye v. Porter, 7 El. & Bl. 58, 78, 119 Eng. Rep. 1169, 1177 (1856) (beneficiary
not aware of property). See In re Butler's Estate, 29 Cal.2d 644, 177 P.2d 16,
20 (1947) (beneficiaries were "known heirs").
"The speedy solicitation of powers of attorney from 'known legatees' who
would receive . . .their bequests in the usual course of the administration
of the estate ... is an exploitation unfavorable and adverse to public policy."

Carey v. Thieme, 2 N.J. Super. 458, 64 A.2d 394, 399 (Ch. 1949). It is the
administrator's duty to search for a decedent's next of kin. Mcllwain's
Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 619, 624 (1936). In In re Wellington's Estate, 154 Misc.
271, 276 N.Y. Supp. 946, 947 (Surr. Ct. 1935), it was established that the status
and relationship of the heir, as next of kin, would have been proven without
the intervention of the heir-chaser. But see, Sparne v. Altshuler, 90 A.2d 919
(R.I. 1952) where the court upheld the heir-chaser's contract that the heir
was contacted in due course of law.
32. In re Cohen's Estate, 66 Cal. App.2d 450, 152 P.2d 485, 487 (1944) (two
years a reasonable lapse of time). The facts in Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180,
150 N.E. 9, 10 (1926), indicate that the estate was accounted for and settled
except for the unknown portion; the contract for the sale of information was
held valid. Compare Sparne v. Altshuler, 90 A.2d 919 (R.I. 1952) (court
ignored fact that heir was later contacted by administrator), with Transcript
of Record, p. 9, Downs v. Altshuler, Eq. No. 21801, R.I. Super. Ct., 1953 (court
recognized that heir would have been found by the estate). Both cases arose
out of the same contract and estate and decided by the same court.
33. See, e.g., In re Butler's Estate, 29 Cal.2d 644, 177 P.2d 16, 20 (1947); In re
Reilly's Estate, 81 Cal. App.2d 564, 184 P.2d 922 (1947) (agreements procured
only 18 days after death of decedent); McIlwain's Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 619
(1936) (14 days after issuance of letters). But see Sparne v. Altshuler, 90
A.2d 919, 920 (R.I. 1952) (three months after issuance).
34. See Sprye v. Porter, 7 El. & B. 58, 119 Eng. Rep. 1169 (1856) (twenty
percent held reasonable); Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369, 131 Eng. Rep. 143,
146 (C.P. 1831) (one-eighth).
35. In re Guardianship of O'Donnell's Estate, 85 Cal. App.2d 1, 192 P.2d 94
(1948) (forty percent); see Wood v. Casserleigh, 30 Colo. 287, 71 Pac. 360,
362 (1902); Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 150 N.E. 9, 10 (1926) (fifty percent); Rees v. De Bernardy, [1896] 2 Ch. 437, 444 (fifty percent); cf. Miller
v. Anderson, 183 Wis. 163, 196 N.W. 869, 870 (1924) (fifty percent for information on lost shipments).
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rate being about thirty percent.3 6 In re Guardianship of O'Donnell's
Estate37 points out that the courts "will follow the rule applying to
the fixing of attorney's fees, and therefore the court must be advised
to the extent and nature of the services rendered before using its own
judgment of the reasonable value of these services."38 The question
of reasonableness of compensation is properly one for the court to
determine. 39
Elements of Champerty:
Heir-hunting often contains the earmarks of champerty and maintenance. Champerty has been defined as "the unlawful maintenance
of a suit in consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing
in dispute or some profit out of it."40 Maintenance is the "officious

intermeddling in a suit that in no way belongs to one, by maintaining
4
or assisting.., with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it." 1
Where "there is no agreement to divide the thing in suit, the party
intermeddling is guilty of maintenance only; but where he stipulates
to receive part of the thing in suit, he is guilty of champerty."' At
common law these doctrines would void any contract under which a
genealogist attempted to recover a missing heir's claim. Where these
doctrines are not recognized, some statutes regulate assignments of
43
this type as being against public policy.
36. See Merlaud v. National Metropolitan Bank, 84 F.2d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir.

1936) (one-third); In re Larson's Estate, 92 Cal. App.2d 267, 206 P.2d 852, 856
(1949) (thirty percent); In re Cohen's Estate, 66 Cal. App.2d 450, 152 P.2d
485, 488 (1944) (thirty percent); Sparne v. Altshuler, 90 A.2d 919, 920 (R.I.
1952) (one-third).
37. 85 Cal. App.2d 1, 192 P.2d 94, rehearingdenied, 85 Cal. App.2d 816, 193
P.2d 143 (1948).
38. Id. at 100.
39. In re Cohen's Estate, 66 Cal. App.2d 450, 152 P.2d 485, 488 (1944).
40. McIlwain's Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 619, 623 (1936); see Merrell v. Stuart,
220 N.C. 326, 17 S.E.2d 458, 462 (1941), and cases cited therein.

41. 14 C.J.S., Champerty and Maintainance§ 1 b (1939).
42. 14 C.J.S., Champerty and Maintenance § 5 (1939). "The champertor has
in view a profit to himself in a share of the spoils of the litigation. The maintainer is more of a voluntary intermeddler and stirrer up of strife for the love
of it. He is described as an 'officious' intermeddler." Breeden v. Brankford
Marine, Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 110 Mo. App. 312, 315, 85 S.W. 930, 931
(1905).

43. "The court before making distribution ... to any assignee or ... any
attorney-in-fact of any heir ... may .. .inquire into the consideration for
such assignment . . .amount of fees . . .paid by the heir . . . and into the
circumstances surrounding the execution of such assignment . . . and if it
finds that the fees .. paid by any such heir... is grossly unreasonable ...
it may refuse to make distribution pursuant thereto. . . ." See CAL. PROS. CODE
ANNOTATIONS § 1020.1 (1944). For interpretation of this statute, see In re
Butler's Estate, 29 Cal.2d 644, 177 P.2d 16 (1947) (public policy limits the
rights of assignees of any heir); In re Larson's Estate, 92 Cal. App.2d 267, 206
P.2d 852 (1949) (heir-hunter's services must be of value and the compensation
reasonable); In re Lund's Estate, 65 Cal. App.2d 151, 150 P.2d 211 (1944) (this
section grants jurisdiction under certain circumstances to ignore an assign-

ment to heir-hunters). This statute with its regulation of distribution is illustrative of one of the several types of statutes. Another general type of
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While a contract merely to furnish information upon consideration
of a share in the recovery is not invalid,44 the courts have held champertous similar contracts in which the heir-hunter, expressly 45 or impliedly,46 agrees to furnish such evidence as should be sufficient to win
a lawsuit;4 7 to exert influence to procure such additional evidence as
may be requisite to establish a claim;48 to testify in the beneficiary's
behalf; 49 or to assist actively in recovery of the property for the beneficiary. 50 Where these contracts contravene public policy tending to
the perversion of justice, 51 they are invalid.
To ascertain the presence of any of these elements of champerty the
courts must remain keenly aware not only of the written contract,
but of the entire transaction as shown by the respective positions of
the parties, 52 the services actually contemplated 53 and other circumstances tending to show assistance in contemplated litigation,5 4 the
legislation which has been invoked is that declaring the heir-hunter's contract
and activities to be the illegal practice of law: (1) by the nonlawyer, Carey
v. Thieme, 2 N.J. Super. 458, 64 A.2d 394 (Ch. 1949); In re Lynch's Estate, 154
Misc. 260, 276 N.Y. Supp. 939 (Surr. Ct. 1935); (2) by the lawyer, In re Tuthill,
256 App. Div. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1st Dep't 1939) (violation of the Canons
of Professional Ethics); (3) by a corporation, In re Vogelsang's Estate, 162
Misc. 257, 293 N.Y. Supp. 346 (Surr. Ct. 1937); In re Lynch's Estate, 154 Misc.
260, 276 N.Y. Supp. 939 (Surr. Ct. 1935); In re Wellington's Estate, 154 Misc.
271, 276 N.Y. Supp. 946 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
44. See Wedgerfield v. De Bernardy, 24 T.L.R. 497 (1908); Sprye v. Porter,
7 El. &B1. 58, 119 Eng. Rep. 1169, 1177 (1856); Note, 34 A.L.R. 1534, 1539 (1925);
see Sparne v. Altshuler, 90 A.2d 919, 924 (R.I. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
45. In re Butler's Estate, 29 Cal.2d 644, 177 P.2d 16, 17, 171 A.L.R. 343 (1947);
Merrell v. Stuart, 220 N.C. 326, 17 S.E.2d 458 (1941).
46. "[Tjhe defendant .

.

. took care that the document .

.

. should on the

face of them not shew anything beyond a promise on his part to give information. But I am satisfied that he represented .

.

. that he would recover the

property.... ." Rees v. De Bernardy, [1896] 2 Ch. 437, 447. See note 26 supra.
47. Note, 34 A.L.R. 1529, 1540 (1925).
48. Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369, 131 Eng. Rep. 143, 146 (1831).
49. Miller v. Anderson, 183 Wis. 163, 196 N.W. 869, 871 (1924).
50. Rees v. De Bernardy, [1896] 2 Ch. 437, 444-46.
51. See Miller v. Anderson, 183 Wis. 163, 196 N.W. 869, 871 (1924) (hiring
witness on contingent fee basis held contrary to public policy). Cf. Worlton
v. Daris, 249 P.2d 810, 813 (Idaho 1952). "[I]t is the evil tendency of the
contract and not its actual injury to the public that is determinative." Stearns
v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833, 837 (1952).
52. Compare Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 150 N.E. 9, 11 (1926) (competent persons on equal footing), with Downs v. Altshuler, Eq. No. 21801, R.I.
Super. Ct., 1953 (not on equal footing). "It becomes the duty of the courts
to see that no improper advantage is taken either of the ignorance or necessities of those who enter into such contracts." Perry v. Dickens, 105 Pa. 83, 89
(1884). See also McIlwain's Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 619, 623 (1936).
53. Cf. Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506,
507, 28 Am. St. Rep. 568 (1892) (no implied contract arises from communicating of valuable information). Compare Casserleigh v. Wood, 119 Fed. 308
(8th Cir. 1902) (a contract for the purpose of gambling in litigation), with
Wood v. Casserleigh, 30 Colo. 287, 71 Pac. 360 (1902) (a valid contract for
the sale of evidence).
54. "It is not what [the heir-chaser] told [the heir] but what he failed to
tell her ...

[While] the contract itself is not champertous .

.

. the evidence

shows that the [heir-chasers] carried on the case as if it were their own .... "
Transcript of Record, p. 15, Downs v. Altshuler, Eq. No. 21801, R.I. Super. Ct.,
1953. "A resort to extrinsic circumstances, [is] proper to consider in con-

NOTES
common element of champertous contracts.55 The contingent nature

of the heir-hunter's compensation suggests that the genealogist intended to take all steps necessary to the heir's recovery. The professional heir-hunters have on occasion successfully avoided this inference of champerty by only agreeing to furnish information to establish
the claim,5 6 rather than to win- the suit, or by expressly refusing to
participate in any litigation concerning the property.5 7 The obvious
disadvantage to the heir-hunter of such a limited contract is that if
the beneficiary refuses to sue the estate to enforce his claim, the
genealogist can not force him to do so.58
Conclusion:
Although the cases clearly define the law and public policy applicable to the genealogist's contract, the important variable is the individual factual situation and its implications. The courts have upheld the heir-hunter's contract when the following factors were predominant in the suit: where the services of the genealogist amounted
to valuable consideration; 9 where the parties were competent and
on equal footing;60 where there was no implied or express agreement
to participate in existing or contemplated litigation;61 where the beneficiary accepted the evidence which established his claim and received
the benefit of the claim;62 where there was no duty on the party pro63
ducing the evidence to so act.
nection with the language of the contract, [for it] manifests this intention
of the parties still more clearly." Wood v. Casserleigh, 30 Colo. 287, 71 Pac. 360,
362 (1902).
55. Existing or contemplated litigation is the foundation of common law
champerty. See Stotsenburg v. Marks, 79 Ind. 193, 197 (1881); F. B. Vandergrift & Co. v. Langon Zinc. Co., 87 Kan. 376, 378, 124 Pac. 534, 535 (1912);
Waller's Adm'x v. Marks, 100 Ky. 541, 38 S.W. 894, 896-97 (1897); Scott v.
Harmon, 109 Mass. 237, 238 (1872).
56. In re Cohen's Estate, 66 Cal. App.2d 450, 152 P.2d 485 (1944); Wedgerfield v. De Bernardy, 24 T.L.R. 497 (1908).
57. Sprye v. Porter, 7 El. & B1. 58, 119 Eng. Rep. 1169, 1177 (1856).
58. Grass v. Campbell, 26 Ohio App. 460, 160 N.E. 511 (1927), af'd, 118 Ohio
St. 285, 160 N.E. 852 (1928).
59. Sprye v. Porter, 7 El. & Bl. 58, 119 Eng. Rep. 1169 (1856) (abundant
consideration for the contract and advantage derived by the beneficiary).
Also see, Stroemer v. Van Orsdel, 74 Neb. 132, 107 N.W. 125, 4 L.R.A. (.N.s.)
212 (1906).
60. Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 150 N.E. 9, 42 A.L.R. 1142 (1924); see
Sparne v. Altshuler, 90 A.2d 919, 924 (R.I. 1952) (dissenting opinion agrees
with majority on three points). Cf. 9 AM. JuR., Cancelation of Instruments

§ 25 at 372 (1937).
61. See In re Cohen's Estate, 66 Cal. App.2d 450, 152, P.2d 485, 487 (1944)
(services consisted solely in proving the heir's relationship); Kaplan v. Suher,
supra note 64 (agreement for the sale of information only); Wedgerfield v.
De Bernardy, 24 T.L.R. 497, aff'd, 25 T.L.R. 21 (1908) (merely information);
Sprye v. Porter, 7 El. & Bl. 58, 119 Eng. Rep. 1169, 1177 (1856) (express agreement not to enter into any litigation).
62. See Wood v. Casserleigh, 30 Colo. 287, 71 Pac. 360, 363, 97 Am. St. Rep.
138, 144 (1902) (defense of unreasonableness of compensation unavailable).
63. Kaplan v. Suher, 254 Mass. 180, 150 N.E. 9, 10-11 (1926) (the duty to
inform); Casserleigh v. Wood, 14 Colo. App. 265, 59 Pac. 1024, 1030

(no dereliction of duty).
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Only when none of the illegal elements has been adequately impressed upon the court will the contract be held valid. The conclusion
is obvious, however, that the professional heir-hunters seek only to
operate within the bare periphery of legality. With few exceptions,
heir-hunting, though possibly a legitimate profession when properly
pursued, will be hounded by the bar and frowned upon by the bench.
Frank C. Ingraham

